Historical Background of Renunciation of Demand for War Reparations，Way of Nongovernmental Claim for Compensation From Japan

　　Article 5 of the 1972 Joint Communiqué of Japan and China provides: “The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan.”However, Wang Jianlang, researcher with the Modern History Research Institute of China Academy of Social Sciences, has expressed a point of view on this issue: “The renunciation of demand for war reparations by China in the capacity of a State does not belong to the return of good for evil as the Chinese say. Rather, it is a result of gradual international pressure.” The zeal of the socialist new China for internationalism was of course not the sole cause for consideration for the renunciation of demand for war reparations. However, it seems doubtful to interpret the decision of the then Chinese leaders to renounce war reparations as a consequence of international pressure. In the1970s, the new China shifted the emphasis of ideological in developing a new pattern of foreign relations onto supremacy of the interests of State security and the differentiation of nations into “three worlds”. The decision of China on renunciation of demand for war reparations from Japan as stipulated in the Joint Communiqué of Japan and of China was in conformity with this change of lines. This article has been written to expound the following three issues in this respect.

　　Ⅰ.The issue of war reparations and the Far East policy of the United States

　　The international background against which that the Kuomintang government and the Taiwanese authorities renounced the right to seek war reparations from Japan

　　In the process of working out and signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1952 Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan, Japan took advantage of the confrontation between the US led and Soviet led blocs and the state of separation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits to exert international pressure on the Kuomintang government, eventually attaining the goal of winning the renunciation by the Chinese side of the right to seek war reparations from Japan.

　　After the end of World War II, the United States solely occupied Japan and dominated the Far East Commission as the supreme organ for the occupation and governance of Japan by the Allied Nations. The policy of the Allied Nations on Japan's war reparations increasingly became a tool intended to serve the Far East policy of the United States. The policy of the United States on Japan's war reparations changed from firm demand, gradual reduction until termination to eventual renunciation, which to a great extent played a decisive role in making the Kuomintang government declare the renunciation of the right to seek war reparations from Japan.

　　For the United States, containing the spread of communism across the world was more important than containing the rise of Japan after the end of World War H. Well before the implementation of any scheme on Japan's war reparations, relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union became increasingly strained. Meanwhile, a civil war was fought between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in China. Afterwards, the contradiction between the United States and the former Soviet Union exacerbated over the People's Uprising in Berlin in June 1953; the Kuomintang government lost the civil war and fled to Taiwan; and the situation remained tense in the Korean peninsula. All these factors prompted the United States to make the decision on accelerating the promotion of economic revival of Japan.

　　In the early 1950s, there was a fundamental turn of the policy of the United States on Japan's war reparations toward non-compensations. The United States spared no effort to realize peace with Japan as early as possible at the expense of the interests of nations victimized in World War II. In September1951, the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed at the San Francisco． Peace Conference and er the circumstance that China and Korea was not invited to attend it, India and Burma refused to attend it and the former Soviet Union, Poland and the former Czechoslovakia refused to sign the treaty. As the eventual provision for Japan's war reparations, Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides: “Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question.”

　　It was under such international pressure that determined the decision-making of the Kuomintang government concerning Japan's war reparations. In1950, the United States no longer supported the claim of the Kuomintang government for war reparations from Japan. In fighting for its sovereign status, a Kuomintang government increasingly losing favor internationally tried hard to gain permission to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference. Suggested by the policy of non-compensation ism of the United States, the Taiwanese authorities had hinted that it could renounce the right to seek war reparations from Japan in exchange for permission to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference. Although the United States was willing to allow the Taiwanese authorities under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to send representatives to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference, any proposal to let the Taiwanese authorities to attend the meeting was opposed by Britain, which had established diplomatic relations with the new China. For the United States, it would not like to offend a major ally for the sake of China. Consequently, neither the People’s Republic of China nor the Taiwanese authorities was able to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference, and the issue of seeking war reparations from Japan was shelved.

　　Afterwards, Japan chose to sign a peace treaty with the Taiwanese authorities. In negotiations between the two sides that started on February 19,1952, Japan, taking advantage of the psychology of the Taiwanese authorities to exert its utmost to fight for legitimacy and the status quo that the capacity of actual control of the Taiwanese authorities was no match for the Chinese Mainland, pressured the Taiwanese authorities to make concessions on the issue of war reparations step by step. Besides, under the excuse that the Japanese property left over in the Mainland was sufficient enough for compensation, Japan demanded that the Taiwanese authorities “show leniency” to Japan, and persistently demanded that no reparations be made. Under the intimidation of Japan and pressure of the United States, the Taiwanese authorities eventually made concessions. To win the provision in the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China that “the terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of its Government,” the Taiwanese authorities declared that to show leniency and friendship to the Japanese people, the Republic of China voluntarily renounced the benefits of services of the State of Japan prescribed by Article 14 (a) 1 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco Peace Conference. On May 5, 1952, the then Chinese Primer Zhou Enlai (18981976), on behalf of the Chinese government, issued a statement to declare that the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China was illegal, and that the Chinese government would never recognize it. However, as the decision of the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kaishek was a fait accompli, if the new China could not adopt an attitude outdoing that of the previous government, it would easily create a misunderstanding internationally that China made retrogress in showing leniency to Japan. It has to be admitted that the new China had less room to maneuver in making the decision on renouncing the demand for war reparations from Japan because of historical factors.

　　Ⅱ．Demand for war reparations from Japan and provision of antihegemonyterms

　　The shift of new China’s decision making on foreign relations

　　In the 1970s, there were profound changes in the international situation. In 1971, China resumed its legitimate seat in the United Nations. In ensuing years, China and the United States got close to each other to improve relations. Such developments promoted Japan to adopt an attitude toward redressing the abnormal state of relations with China. The new China welcomed this attitude of Japan, made efforts to improve relations between China and Japan in many respects, and eventually adopted an attitude toward the issue of war reparations that is highly lenient and forward-looking. In the new China's decision-making to this effect, the aforesaid international pressure caused by historical factors did play a role, but the more important positive factor was the new China’s change of policy on ideology and judgment of the international situation.

　　In the process of negotiation over the Joint Communiqué of Japan and China, the Japanese side always and very much insisted on the legal status of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China, alleging that it was an issue concerning trustworthiness in international relations, and denied the legitimacy of China's renunciation of its demand for war reparations from Japan. But what was lying behind the Japanese insistence was the State interests of Japan. The exemption of Japan from war reparations enabled the postwar Japan to preserve strength and develop rapidly is an indisputable fact. Although the then Japan was still under the umbrella of the 1951 Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, the impression of being abandoned created by the “overhead diplomacy” of the United States and appeals for solving the issue of the Four Northern Islands with the former Soviet Union made Japan more inclined to keep a pro American foreign policy in dealing with both the United States and the former Soviet Union, in seeking interests in the maximum. For Japan, war reparations were an issue that should be insisted on more than the issue of adding ant hegemony terms in an international treaty.

　　But for China, it has different considerations. The new China expressed the position that the decision made by the Taiwanese authorities to renounce the right to claim war reparations from Japan could not represent the demand of the whole Chinese people; that the Chinese people suffered tremendously from the war of aggression imposed on China by the Japanese imperialists, but the Japanese government had not made an appropriate response; and that the Chinese people had the right to claim war reparations from Japan. But on the eve of normalization of relations between China and Japan, China was considering the issue of renouncing its demand for war reparations from Japan for the sake of friendship between the two countries. The factors prompting China to consider this issue included sincere ideological considerations of socialism and internationalism, and naturally included the aforesaid references of historical background. But changes of the international situation and the redefinition of foreign policies on the part of the new China in the 1970s should have been the more important factors. The “overhead diplomacy” of the United States and deterioration of relations between China and the former Soviet Union since the 1950s made China revise its foreign policy of wholly sided with the former Soviet Union and making definitions on the basis of ideological lines in place since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and start to consider the possibility of countering Soviet threats from the perspective of State security interests.

　　After late Chinese leader Mao Zedong (18931976) put forward the theory of “intermediary zones” and “the first and second intermediary zones” in the 1950s and the 1960s, Mao's theory of differentiating nations into “three worlds” gradually developed. In talks with visiting former Zambian President Kenneth David Kaunda in February1974, Mao unveiled his “three worlds “theory by saying: “In my opinion, the United States and the Soviet Union are the first world; the middle of the roaders, Japan, Europe and Canada are the second world; and we are the third world.” “The third world is very populous. Asia except Japan all belongs to the third world. The whole of Africa belongs to the third world. And Latin America belongs to the third world as well,” Mao explained. The “three worlds” theory served to break the situation of leaning to one side in ideology, and provide the basis for the socialist China to develop a new situation of foreign relations and establish a united front. In 1955, China and India jointly put forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, whose contents are different from the line of peaceful transition, peaceful competition and peaceful coexistence put forward by late Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev(18941971). Although based on the consideration of winning space for development in building socialist countries like similar policy of the former Soviet Union, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as an integral set of principles, is intended to solve problems between China neighboring countries and between China and other developing countries. It is more focused on eliminating doubts and nonconference of such countries in China, and it emphasizes that the socialist China sincerely wishes to make friends and jointly launch with other countries struggles against colonialism and hegemony and for establishing a new world order. Both the “three worlds” theory and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were major foreign policies adopted by the new China to oppose Soviet hegemony in the 1970s. The normalization of relations between China and Japan was not only a result of policy change of the United States and improvement of relations between China and the United States, but was also a strategic need of the Chinese side for opposing Soviet hegemony under the guidance of the aforesaid policies or principles. Just because of this, in the process of negotiation over the Joint Communiqué of Japan and China and the 1978 China Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the ant hegemony terms were among the contents most concerned about by the Chinese sides, besides the issue of Taiwan that relates to China's great cause of sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity.

　　Because of this reason, in the process of negotiation over the Joint Communiqué of Japan and China and the 1978 China Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, although there was great differences between the two sides over expression of China's renunciation of its demand for war reparations from Japan, China, in the interest of friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, decided to renounce its demand for war reparations from Japan which it has the right to claim. As a result, the renunciation was defined with the expression of “China renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan “rather than “China renounces the right to claim war reparations from Japan”. In negotiation over the definition of ant hegemony terms, China was much more persistent. Consequently, the ant hegemony term in the Joint Communiqué of Japan and China was defined with this expression: “The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” After China proposed the inclusion of the ant hegemony term into the treaty, Japan agreed to add it to the treaty upon confirmation by China that the antihegemonyterm was not directed against the United States or the former Soviet Union. After Japan accepted the inclusion of the ant hegemony term, the Chinese side made appropriation acceptance of other demands raised by the Japanese side, including separate expression of the three principles governing the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, cessation of the insistence on the wording of “terminating the state of war”, and consented to changing the wording of renouncing “the right to claim war reparations” into that of renouncing “its demand for war reparations” after the Japanese side expressed its readiness to reflect on the responsibility of war.

　　In short, in view of the then international situation and the different points of emphasis expressed by the two sides in the process of negotiation, the new China's declaration in the Joint Communiqué of Japan and China to renounce its demand for war reparations from Japan should have been closely related to China's insistence on and concern about the inclusion of the ant hegemony term in the Joint Communiqué of Japan and China and subsequently in the China Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Moreover, the insistence and concern was a consequence of China's efforts to revise its highly ideological foreign policy in accordance with the international situation since the beginning of the 1970s. For the theory of differentiation of nations into “three worlds” and the Chinese style Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, they were both guidelines for these efforts, which were not only based on China's concern about its practical State security, but was also based on the belief in ideology and the spirit of self-reliance and creation of China as a socialist country.

　　Ⅲ. Consideration of claim for war reparations from Japan

　　Possible nongovernmental efforts for compensation

　　After many twists and turns, China and Japan eventually concluded the China Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978. Because China’s policy of opposing Soviet hegemony remained unchanged, the Chinese side insisted on the inclusion of an ant hegemony term in this treaty. Before this development, the former Soviet Union was always dissatisfied with the ant hegemony term to some extent, and the Japanese government made some diplomatic efforts to this effect, including the obtainment of encouragement from the United States on the issue of signing the treaty with China, striving to eliminate Soviet hostility toward the ant hegemony term, coordination of efforts to solve problems existing in relations with the former Soviet Union, winning understanding of China on the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands called by Japan), and maneuver in modifying the wording of the treaty.

　　The corresponding Chinese compromise might have been the concessions made in the definition of the term on war reparations since the conclusion of the Joint Communiqué of Japan and China. With two major policies the theory of differentiation of nations into “three worlds” and development of anantihegemony united front and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China relatively successfully developed a new situation of foreign relations, and gained some initiative in countering Soviet hegemony. Both the Joint Communiqué of Japan and China and the China Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded under the guidance of these policies do deserve commendation for laying a solid foundation for the development of Sino Japanese friendship. But looking back at history and looking forward into the future, we should further explore better ways of settling the issue of war reparations. Of course, the decision taken by the Taiwanese authorities led by Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek under international pressure resulted in limiting the room for maneuver by the new China in this respect. Besides, China, which had already become less and less emphatic on ideology, did not expect the drastic change of the political system in the former Soviet Union and East European states in the late 1980s and the early1990s. However, the issue of war reparations, apart from the political significance of placing it on a par with the ant hegemony term, should have been of broader social and historical significance. We should reaffirm the courage of Premier Zhou Enlai to declare the position that the Chinese people had the right to claim war reparations from Japan and that the renunciation was only based on the consideration of friendship between China and Japan. Since China, as a sovereign country, has renounced its governmental demand for war reparations from Japan in the form of a treaty, we should earnestly stick to the established principles, take history as a mirror and look forward into the future. But as the Sino Japanese treaties are serious and bilateral, we should be vigilant at anytime against unilateral maintenance of superficial friendship to connive at Japan’s willful violation of established principles. Presently, the many problems in nongovernmental claim for compensation that have not been appropriately settled deserve concern. We should resolutely oppose Japan's attitude of not attaching importance to reflection on the responsibility of war and settlement of problems left over from the war. In future, a most important direction of efforts in this respect will be to explore possible ways of settling problems in nongovernmental claim for compensation from Japan.

　　Cases of nongovernmental Chinese claim for compensation from Japan are of legal grounds prescribed by international law. The conception of war reparations in the sense of international law originated in the late 18tn century and the early 19th century. But its meaning changed after the end of World War I. According to Ding Wei, professor with East China Institute of Political Science and Law, besides extending traditional war reparations to victorious nations, defeated nations must also make compensations for civilian and property losses sustained by belligerent countries that have been directly caused by war, with the former being war reparations and the latter being indemnities for injury. The recipients of these two forms of compensations are different from each other. So are the causes, ways and channels of their extension. Recipients of indemnities for injury, besides victorious nations, also include citizens and corporations of the injured countries that have sustained losses or injury in war. This is because property losses sustained by victorious nations that have been indirectly caused by the war of aggression launched by defeated nations as well as the personal and property losses and injury of citizens and property losses of corporations of victorious nations that have been caused by acts of aggression all belong to the scope of compensations which they have the right to claim. What the then Chinese government renounced was only the right to claim war reparations.

　　“Although the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land does not provide that individuals victimized in war can directly seek compensation, it does not deny the right of individuals victimized in war to seek compensations. Rather, it specifically provides for the obligation of defeated nations to make compensations. Meanwhile, the development of international law following the two world wars and international common law formed in the field of war reparations both indicate that individuals victimized in war have the right to claim compensations from defeated nations,” Ding Wei said, “As a defeated nation, Japan cannot evade itsunshirkable responsibility as a State to extend indemnities for injury. Nongovernmental Chinese victims do have the right to claim compensations from the Japanese government in accordance with international private law.” “If Japanese courts refuse to make adjudication, enforce law partially or restrict the litigious rights of the Chinese parties concerned, the Chinese parties concerned can, under the circumstance of having exhausted all the local resources of judicial remedy available for them, request the Chinese government to exercise the right of diplomatic protection. Under such a circumstance, the Chinese government can, in accordance with the principle of nationality, make representations to the Japanese government through normal diplomatic channels. If the governments of the two countries are unable to solve the dispute concerned, there exists theoretically the possibility of dispute settlement through international arbitration or adjudication by international courts,” DingWei explained.

　　Presently, as the Japanese side is unwilling to face up to history, there exist numerous difficulties to many cases of nongovernmental Chinese claim for war reparations from Japan. Japan mostly adopts an evasive or prevaricating attitude toward justifiable nongovernmental claim of victims of war for compensations. As a result, many problems left over from war have not been solved satisfactorily. China must resolutely oppose such an attitude of the Japanese side in disregard of international trustworthiness and international responsibility, and consider the adoption of effective solutions. At least, China should urge the Japanese government to fulfill its obligations prescribed by international law and treat nongovernmental claim for war reparations in an impartial way.

　　“In finding solutions to nongovernmental claim by Chinese victims for compensations from the Japanese government, the Sino British agreement on the settlement of mutual claim for assets left over from history signed by the Chinese and British governments in Beijing on June 5, 1987 can be referred to in imitation. Namely, the Japanese government can firstly pay a lump sum of funds to the Chinese government. Under such a condition, the Chinese government can make a commitment not to represent Chinese citizens in demanding the establishment of responsibility of the Japanese government for compensations and not to support any such claim for assets. By doing so, the issue of war reparations left over from history can be solved in one move. Then, the Chinese government can, in accordance with Chinese law, be responsible for settling the claim of Chinese victims for assets, and be responsible for distributing the funds obtained under agreement,” Ding Wei said.

　　Regardless of whether such a solution will eventually be feasible, the Chinese government should manage to look for a chance and strive to find a better solution to the issue of war reparations left over from history while maintaining Sino Japanese friendship, which is also a responsibility entrusted to China by history．